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1. The elections held in the Croatian Danube Re-
gion on April 17, 1997, represent a historic turning
point for the Republic of Croatia. All that is now
left for the new Transitional Administration, is to
ensure the technical aspects of the transfer of au-
thority to the democratically elected bodies, thus
placing even the last part of Croatian territory un-
der the effective control of the Croatian authori-
ties. For Croatia, this will put an end to one period
- the period of struggle for Croatia, and mark the
beginning of a new period - that of struggle for the
quality of life in Croatia.
2. The period of struggle for Croatia began with the
struggle for emancipation as a state and for inter-
national recognition. The independence of the Re-
public of Croatia was less than welcomed in a con-
siderable section of the international community.
The member states of the Non-Aligned Movement,
meaning over one-half of all UN members, saw in
the SFRY one of their founding members and found
it hard to accept its disintegration. The US and
Europe, for their part, considered stability in the
geopolitically unstable region of Southeast Europe
preferable to the democratic potential of the states
emerging from the disintegrated SFRY. Russia,
again, took the side of Serbia and Montenegro, more
or less openly, supporting a Serb-dominated Yugo-
slavia, in other words, Greater Serbia.
Independence did not only signify the
realisation of the age-old dream of Croats to have
their own state but also provided a chance of at-
taining through this state some qualities and demo-
cratic values that both the first and the second Yu-
goslavia had failed to provide. In striving to per-
form this ambitious task, the Republic of Croatia
had to overcome some formidable obstacles. Po-
litical and economic transition from one-party dic-
tatorship and a socialist economy to political de-
mocracy and market orientation is in itself a pro-
cess taking a heavy social toll. Parallel to this,
Croatia was constituting itself as an autonomous
state, with all the bodies and functions this entails.
And precisely then, at the most vulnerable stage of
this transition, Croatia was subjected to brutal ag-
gression.
The struggle to repel this aggression, and later
the struggle to free the occupied territories, left no
doubt as to the priorities to be pursued by Croatian
diplomacy. The admission of the Republic of
Croatia to the United Nations Organisation on May
22, 1992, was - to quote President Tudman in his
inaugural speech before the General Assembly, "the
crowning event of the international recognition of
Croatia's sovereignty and statehood'". Still, the
road to admission to the UN was arduous, and even
membership in this most important world
organisation did not guarantee to Croatia full suc-
cess in the struggle to defend its territorial integ-
rity'.
The aggression against the Republic of
Croatia and then against Bosnia and Herzegovina,
material destruction, loss of life, human rights vio-
lations and war crimes, occupation of parts of its
territory and the presence of peacekeeping forces
on Croatian soil compelled Croatian diplomats at
the United Nations to communicate with the Sec-
retary General and the Security Council much more
intensely than would be typical for a country of
Croatia's size and economic importance. During the
past five years, more reports were made by the Sec-
retary General, more resolutions and presidential
statements passed by the Security Council on the
subject of Croatia than would have normally hap-
pened to a state of similar character during all of
the fifty years of UN existence.
Throughout this period of standing in the
focus of international attention, however, the Re-
public of Croatia primarily figured as an object of
international politics, the scene of the conflict of
interest among some members of the international
community. At the time it was seeking support for
its recognition and for the cessation of aggression
and striving to buy time until it was strong enough
to free its own occupied territories, Croatia favoured
the internationalisation of its question. However,
from the moment the ratio of forces changed and
Croatia became strong enough to deal on with the
remaining problems of its integrity, the status of an
object of capricious international politics was no
longer acceptable.
Equality of states, a fundamental tenet of
international law
International law rests on the idea of the sov-
ereign equality of all states, but, in real-life inter-
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national relations, this is an ideal which has to be
fought for. The Republic of Croatia attained its ter-
ritorial integrity with its own forces, but the earlier
aggression against it took its heavy toll in human
losses and material damage. This aggression and its
consequences have hampered in many ways the ini-
tiated processes of economic transformation and
political democratisation in Croatia. The urgent
need to create a military force in the situation of an
unjust arms embargo made ingenuity a far more
important instrument of survival than discipline and
respect for rules and regulations. The crimes com-
mitted during the aggression, not only in the form
of the barbarity of individuals but as a systematic
use of atrocities for the ethnic cleansing of the oc-
cupied parts of Croatia of all non-Serb population,
instilled in a section of the Croatian population a
thirst for, at times unselective and cruel, revenge.
3. The peaceful reintegration of the Croatian
Danube Region crowns the success of the struggle
for Croatia, since it finally establishes the full in-
tegrity of the state, but it is at the same time a turn-
ing point, inaugurating a new stage - the period of
struggle for the quality of life. Croatia, namely, did
not regain control of the Croatian Danube Region
by force of arms, which it could have done without
major losses and risk of escalation of the conflict.
It opted, instead, for peaceful reintegration, pro-
ceeding from its long-term interests and objectives,
defined at the inception of its statehood.
In the coming period, Croatia's task on the
domestic plane is to continue the processes slowed
down by the aggression: further democratisation,
the consolidation of the rule of law, and a fuller
protection of human rights, with special emphasis
on economic recovery and a higher quality of life.
From a foreign-policy aspect, Croatia is a
young, western-oriented state which wishes to use
its Central European, Mediterranean and Danubian
position for the earliest possible admission to the
European Union and NATO. The fact that its his-
tory, culture and values are part of European
civilisation spurs it on in these efforts, while its in-
volvement in the still existing regional crisis in
Southeast Europe acts as an impediment. The Re-
public of Croatia must now demonstrate that the
period of crisis is behind it, that it is prepared to
cooperate with the world community, but also that
it is mature and confident and that it wishes to ob-
serve its own strategic priorities. In the coming pe-
riod, Croatia must strive to strengthen its interna-
tional position, to free itself from its present one-
sided dependence on the international community,
figuring mainly as an object of international poli-
tics, and to take part in international cooperation
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as an equal subject. This presupposes a gradual
emancipation from international influence on is-
sues relating to Croatia and, at the same time, the
intensification of its participation in the consider-
ation of and decision-making on other, wider issues
of interest to Croatia. It is by dealing with such
wider, regional, and even global issues that it can
build a reputation, which will then be favourably
reflected on its power to take more autonomous
decisions on matters of our immediate interest.
4. Croatian diplomats at the UN are currently pre-
occupied with two groups of priority topics: unre-
solved issues from the times of struggle for inde-
pendence and territorial integrity and topics con-
cerning the future, which will steer Croatia to the
new stage - the struggle for the quality of life.
Chief among the still pending issues from the
period of the struggle for independence and terri-
torial integrity are the questions of the UNT AES
mandate, the presence of UN monitors at Prevlaka,
the International War Crimes Tribunal, and suc-
cession to the former SFR Y.
Policies based on fair play in the Croatian
Danube Region
5. The UN mandate in the Croatian Danube Re-
gion is defined by the Basic Agreement on the Re-
gion of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western
Sirmium and by Security Council Resolutions 1037/
96 and 1079/96. The Basic Agreement envisages a
12-month period under the transitional administra-
tion of the United Nations (it expired on 15 Janu-
ary, 1997), with the possibility of extending it by one
more period of the same duration at the request of
one of the parties. Resolution 1079, invoking the
Basic Agreement and responding to a request by
the local Serbs, specifies that the UNTAES man-
date will last until July 15, 1997, but that the UN
presence will continue in the Croatian Danube Re-
gion till the end of the extended mandate, i.e. till
January 15, 1998, possibly as a restructured
UNTAES, or in some other form.The Croatian pri-
ority interest is that, after July 15, UN presence
should be continued in that region only through its
civilian component and with a restricted mandate.
Although the "transitional period", as defined by
the Basic Agreement and Resolution 1037/96, lasts
until 15th January 1998, a new stage is brought in
after the elections, and the Croatian authorities
should insist that the role of the United Nations in
the Croatian Danube Region be changed.
From its arrival and up to the elections,
UNTAES governed the Croatian Danube Region
r
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in the fullest sense of the word. The purpose of the
transitional stage, starting from the day of the elec-
tions and until July 15, is to facilitate the constitu-
tion of the legitimately elected bodies and for the
Transitional Administrator to transfer his powers
to them. After July 15, in accordance with the Ba-
sic Agreement, UN representatives would continue
to monitor the demilitarisation of the Region, the
return of refugees and displaced persons, and the
observance of human rights till the end of the tran-
sitional period; they would no longer govern but
provide support to the newly elected local authori-
ties during the critical first stage. With January 15,
1998, according to the Basic Agreement and Reso-
lution 1079/96, the transitional period as well as the
UN mandate in the Croatian Danube Region will
come to an end".
In keeping with the recommendation of the
UN Secretary General, made in his letter to the
Chairman of the Security Council of 21 January,
1997 (S/1997/62), the Republic of Croatia has
agreed to intensified talks about long-term
demilitarisation between the Croatian Danube Re-
gion and neighbouring states, primarily with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" However,
Croatian defence and security interests can be safe-
guarded only provided that this demilitarisation is
based on full reciprocity. In accordance with its
obligations from the Basic Agreement, the Repub-
lic of Croatia will not remilitarise the Croatian
Danube Region after the departure of the UNT AES
military component and before the expiry of the
transitional period. It will thus be necessary to com-
plete these talks by the end of that period. Other-
wise, should an agreement on the demilitarisation
of the border area not be reached by the end of the
transitional period and by the time full reintegra-
tion of the Croatian Danube Region into the con-
stitutional and legal system of the Republic of
Croatia is achieved, the presence of regular mili-
tary and police units of the Republic of Croatia will
be established according to Croatian legal regula-
tions and the assessments of the competent Croatian
bodies.
The full attainment of these objectives will
greatly depend on whether Croatia approaches the
fulfilment of its obligations in the process of peace-
ful reintegration in a resolute, reliable and consis-
tent manner. The most appropriate policy in this
respect would be to fulfil entirely all obligations,
including those concerning the human and minor-
ity rights of the Croatian Serbs in the Danube Re-
gion, but then to insist on the other party's meeting
its obligations without further delay or new condi-
tions.
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6. The mandate of the UN monitors at Prevlaka is
defined by Resolutions 779 (1992), 981 (1995) and
1093 (1997) and expires on July 15, 1997. The obli-
gations deriving from the security arrangement at
Prevlaka are defined in the mentioned Security
Council resolutions and in the Agreement on the
Normalisation of Relations between the Republic
of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
signed on 23 August, 1996. Article 4 of the Agree-
ment specifies that, until an agreement is reached
on the question of Pre viaka (as a security issue con-
cerning part of the Croatian territory in the hinter-
land of Dubrovnik and part of the Yugoslav terri-
tory in the area of the Bay of Kotor), the security
regime established under UN monitorship would
continue to apply.
Although all UN resolutions state clearly and
explicitly that this is an integral part of the territory
of the Republic of Croatia, and although Croatia
successfully insisted on reciprocity in
demilitarisation and monitoring so as to cover the
same area on both sides of the state border, the
internationalisation of the Prevlaka question (even
though it is only a security issue) ought to be slowly
brought to an end. It would seem, however, that,
regardless of the obvious differences between the
two issues, the question of the UN monitors at
Prevlaka will probably not be resolved until the end
of the UN presence in the Croatian Danube Re-
gion. Nevertheless, it should be made clear now, in
good time, that there is no intention to extend the
mandate of the monitors at Prevlaka after January
15, 1998. This kind of pressure might help to en-
courage a more effective search for bilateral solu-
tions and induce greater cooperativeness on the part
of the FRY. It is only when the FRY accepts that
this is a security rather than a territorial issue, that
the Prevlaka question will become amenable to a
settlement, and the search for mutually acceptable
rational solutions may begin.
7. The International Tribunal for War Crimes com-
mitted on the territory of the former Yugoslavia was
instituted by Security Council Resolution 827 in
1993. Its establishment was conceived so as to serve
several purposes: to act as a deterrent; to meet the
demands of justice by rendering punishmen t for the
crimes committed; to remove the extremists respon-
sible for the war and war crimes from positions of
influence; and, finally, to pave the way for a future
Permanent International Criminal Court, compe-
tent for all states which accept its jurisdiction.
So far, the work of the International War
Crimes Tribunal has not met expectations. Only 74
indictments, 8 detentions and two convictions are a
very modest result indeed. Admittedly, a tribunal
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with only 11 judges, one courtroom, a prison with
only 24 places and limited resources could not have
punished all the perpetrators of the tens of thou-
sands of war crimes that have been committed.
However, a serious objection can be made regard-
ing the fact that, to date, the Tribunal has not re-
flected proportionately the involvement in war
crimes of the various parties to the conflict. It has,
further, failed to secure even elementary coopera-
tion by all parties, which has led to the paradoxical
situation of an "inverse Nuremberg": it is mostly
the members of national groups that were victims
of aggression who are standing trial. 5
The Republic of Croatia was the object of
aggression and dreadful devastation, and it has also
participated in the establishment of the Tribunal.
Although in any armed conflict the members of all
sides inevitably commit some war crimes, Croats
were incomparably more often victims than culprits.
Croatia should not, therefore, accept that only those
who are at the disposal of the Tribunal should be
tried, since this approach only serves to disguise the
failure and ineffectiveness of the Tribunal, at the
expense of those who cooperate with it. Instead of
concurring, Croatia should insist that the Tribunal
should either perform the task it has been set up
for, and reflect faithfully the character of the con-
flict and the atrocities committed in it or, if it is
unable to do this, admit failure and publicly explain
the reasons for this.
By some of its past actions, including the at-
tempt to use legal expedients that are not permit-
ted either by its own Statute or by international law
- and here I am referring to the subpoena sent to
the Republic of Croatia and its Defence Minister -
the Hague Tribunal is doing a disservice to the de-
velopment of international criminal law and to the
idea of a future permanent international criminal
court of general jurisdiction. As things stand now,
the ineffectiveness, on the one hand, and the at-
tempt to usurp the powers traditionally reserved for
sovereign states, on the other, might make larger
states (who are more often parties to conflicts) as
well as smaller nations (which feel more vulnerable
to possible discriminatory practices) disinclined to
support any further steps in the development of in-
ternational criminal justice.
Succession to the former Yugoslavia is a legal
and economic question, but also a question of
security and politics
8. The succession to the former SFR Y is a legal and
economic issue, but also a political and security one.
The first documents crucial to succession and to the
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delegitimatisation of the non-existing SFRY (which
Serbia and Montenegro tried to use as an excuse
for monopolising the common legacy) are the opin-
ions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission."
Opinion No.8 of the Arbitration Commission states
that the "process of dissolution of the SFRY, men-
tioned in opinion No.1 of 20 November, 1991, has
now been completed and that the SFRY no longer
exists". Opinion No.9 explicitly states that no suc-
cessor state to the former SFRY has the automatic
right to its succession. In opinion No. 10, the Arbi-
tration Commission decided that the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is a
"new state, which cannot be regarded as the only
successor state to the SFR Y".
Unfortunately, in spite of the absolute explic-
itness of the arbitration findings, the question of
succession has been resolved only partly within the
UN system. Security Council Resolutions 777 and
821 from 1992 and the General Assembly Resolu-
tion 47/1 specify that the "state under the name of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia no
longer exists" and that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot auto-
matically succeed SFR Y membership in that
organisation but that it must request admission to
UN membership as a new state. Nevertheless, the
name-plate with the word Yugoslavia, behind which
nobody has the right to sit, and the flag, which after
the proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia no longer represents a state, have been re-
tained, introducing perplexity and confusion. Karl
August Fleischauer, Deputy UN Secretary General
for Legal Affairs, in his opinion of 29 September
1992, stated (referring to the Security Council Reso-
lution No. 777 from 1992) that the "resolution does
not remove or suspend Yugoslavia from the
Organisation" and that "resolutions do not deprive
Yugoslavia of the right to take part in the work of
the bodies, except the bodies of the Assembly". On
the basis of this interpretation of the status of the
former Yugoslavia, which goes against Croatian in-
terests, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who
skilfully used a similar name as the predecessor
state, has been able to participate in some forms of
activity within the United Nations (for example, to
submit and distribute documents).
Croatia has retained a principled position
with regard to succession from the time of the dis-
integration of Yugoslavia until the present day, fully
in conformance with the findings of the Badinter
arbitration commission and with the relevant rules
of international law which regulate these questions.
The author believes that this principled stand should
be upheld." As for other international organisations,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can be admit-
i
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ted exclusively as a new state, having met the re-
quirements made on new members. Before notify-
ing in an appropriate manner its succession to indi-
vidual international agreements, as was done by
the other successors, the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia cannot be recognised as party to these
agreements, and thus cannot be invited to take part
in the conferences of the signatories.
The property, archives and debts of the
former SFRY must be divided in accordance with
the principles of the Vienna conventions on suc-
cession of 1978 and 1983. The property, assets and
debts of the former SFRY in third states must be
also equally divided among all successor states. In
view of the fact that internationally mediated talks
on succession have so far failed to yield any results
because of the uncooperative stance of FR Y, which
continues its usurpation of the common property,
Croatia should urge the acceleration of these talks
and intensified international pressure on the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. Even if Yugoslavia
should submit a request to be admitted to interna-
tional organisations as a new state, this request
ought not to be granted until it meets the obliga-
tions inherent in succession.
The circumstance that some aspects of suc-
cession are being kept unresolved primarily so as
to use them as a means of pressure on the parties
has greatly harmed all the successor states. This
applies also to Serbia and Montenegro, who have
been kept out of the United Nations and other in-
ternational organisations for the past five years.
Moreover, the unsettled issue of succession has an
unfavourable effect on the overall peace and sta-
bility in Southeast Europe. The recognition of
Yugoslavia's automatic succession would bear ex-
tremely dangerous consequences, in political as well
as security terms. The logical inference of the rec-
ognition of automatic continuity to Yugoslavia and
of its privileged succession to SFR Y compared to
all other successors would be that all of the other
republics of the former SFR Y seceded, which is an
act contrary to international law. This qualifica-
tion contains negative political and legal connota-
tions, because it offers a different way of looking at
the question of responsibility for the armed con-
flict and hence of the possible obligation to pay repa-
rations. Moreover, the term "secession" is factually
incorrect since one cannot secede from that which
does not exist. However, the long-term security
implications are even more serious. Such an inter-
pretation of the conflict would provide, namely,
political, philosophical, even legal, justification for
the resumption of force, when conditions for this
become ripe, in order to change boundaries and to
create a Greater Serbia. This evil seed might wait
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for years for favourable conditions for growth, a
lasting threat to the stability of a large part of South-
east Europe.
Future topics of Croatian diplomacy - social,
economic and developmental issues
9. Among topics concerning the future - subjects
that Croatian diplomacy is only beginning to address
systematically, but to which attention will gradually
shift, social, economic and development issue stand
in the foreground. Political topics will also figure
here, not those directly relating to Croatia or South-
east Europe but those of a broader, global charac-
ter. Indeed, even social, economic and developmen-
tal topics possess a major political dimension, a cir-
cumstance of which states with longer UN experi-
ence are only too well aware.
To be sure, dealing with the mentioned top-
ics is less spectacular - our views on the crisis in
Albania, the future competences and composition
of the Security Council, or our initiative concern-
ing the protection of the ozone layer, will not place
Croatia in the focus of CNN news, as was the case
during operations Flash and Storm. But this is ex-
actly what the Republic of Croatia needs to strive
for: to move from first-page headlines, which mostly
cover major catastrophes, to small stories on the
middle pages, speaking largely about this year's
tourist offer, stocks and bonds fluctuations, or the
stability of currencies. New topics require new
methods. When dealing with purely political
"Croatian" topics, patriotism and a good knowledge
of local problems were essential. The new topics
demand a breadth of vision, on the one hand, and
expert knowledge in a number of areas, on the other.
The Croatian diplomat still needs patriotism in or-
der to successfully articulate and represent the in-
terests of the Republic of Croatia within the scope
of every topic; but he also needs a breadth of vi-
sion, which is necessary in order to view the various
topics within the context of the general aims of the
international community, the interests of individual
states and of global interdependence.
It is on such general topics that a country ac-
quires a reputation and prestige in the international
community, which is then favourably reflected on
its own standing and ensures greater tolerance of
independent views when it comes to issues of par-
ticular concern to this country. In view of its size
and the limited resources which it can devote to this
task, the Republic of Croatia must select some pri-
ority topics, and then, having worked on them sys-
tematically and over a longer period, assert itself as
an authority on these issues and a factor in deci-
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sion-making on them. Recognisability is crucial in
this, so that whenever such a topic is on the agenda,
every experienced UN diplomat would realise that
- although it is a general problem - it is a "Croatian
topic" and that our diplomacy will be an essential
factor in all initiatives on this issue.
10. An important element of such an entry of
Croatia on the global scene are candidatures for
various offices within the UN system which are con-
sidered essential to Croatian interests. In this, dis-
tinction should be made between three categories
of posts: those that Croatia has a right to under the
quota system, positions that are not subject to quo-
tas but are filled by individual selection, after which
the nominee acts on behalf of the United Nations
and is formally quite independent of his own state,
and posts to which experts are nominated in their
individual capacity. Some results have already been
attained in regard to nominations. The elections of
Prof. Budislav Vukas as judge of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and of Prof. Mladen
Juracic into the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf mark the beginning of a defini-
tion of "Croatian global interests", wherein our
maritime tradition and orientation comes into its
own. The recent election of a Croatian delegate to
the Special Committee on Peace Operations will
make it possible to apply our experience gained in
the course of peace operations in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina to UN reforms in this area
and at the same time to strengthen our influence
on the peace operations that are still in progress in
the Republic of Croatia (UNTAES, UNMOP).
However, our middle-range plans are even more
ambitious. Within the regional group for Eastern
Europe, Croatia has already put up its candidature
for ECOSOC membership, and for places on the
Commission on the Status of Women and the Com-
mission for Population and Development for the
1999-2003 period. In the nearest future, we can as-
pire to the place of Vice-President of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. In the course of the next ten years,
with serious preparation, of course, and on the as-
sumption of favourable developments in interna-
tional relations, Croatia cold successfully compete
for a place in the Security Council as a non-perma-
nent member.
11. In asserting these interests, Croatia faces a num-
ber of advantages and a number of constraints. The
consequences of aggression will be eliminated within
the next few years, and the international commu-
nitywill carefully examine the situation concerning
human and minority rights and the possibility for
refugees and displaced persons to return to their
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homes of origin. After the establishment of a stable
peace in Southeast Europe, Croatia will adopt as
one of its first priorities the speediest possible in-
clusion into European integration processes and
Western security systems, endeavouring to make up
for time lost. The possible maintenance of long-term
links with Islamic states, as a result of the specific
relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina, could
provide to Croatia the position of a specific bridge,
thereby considerably strengthening its regional im-
portance.lts position as a Central European, Medi-
terranean and Danube country at the same time,
and as a communication link between the West and
the Middle East, lend Croatia additional impor-
tance. A contribution to the achievement of peace
and security in Southeast Europe, and subsequently
a role in preserving them, would also have a benefi-
cial effect. Finally, Croatia's input in the non-aligned
Movement at the time it was a member of the
Yugoslav Federation should also be invoked, of
course, always bearing in mind our predominantly
European orientation.
Some of the limiting factors, such as the size
of the country or the length of its membership in
the UN Organisation, are simply beyond the con-
trol of Croatia. But it is important to do what is
possible. For a while longer, the image of Croatia
as a country torn by regional strife will continue to
hamper our involvement in peacetime topics and
our candidatures for influential offices within the
UN system. Nevertheless, the fact that it is a young
state which found the strength to resist aggression
and - cooperating with the United Nation within
the scope of what that organisation had to offer -
succeeded in winning freedom ought to be used to
good advantage.
The debt of the Republic of Croatia to the
United Nations has already reached the sum of
4,535,567 US dollars (of this, almost 3 million go to
peace operations). Even though among the debtor
countries the USA figures prominently (it makes
repayment conditional upon UN reform that would
make it cheaper and more efficient), generally
speaking, the 45 debtor states, each of which owes
to the UN more than a million dollars, is not a club
Croatia would like to belong to for a longer term.
Being on the debtor list, with long-term arrears, is
highly detrimental to the chances of candidates for
all posts within the UN system. This debt was not
such a problem for Croatia as long as it presented
itself as a victim of aggression and destruction.
However, indebtedness and being in the group of
those who are unable to meet their obligations, does
not fit into the new image of Croatia as a young
prosperous Central European country. The possi-
bility of introducing interest rates on the debt, which
.-I
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is currently considered in the working group on the
financial situation of the UN, should be an added
incentive to finding a way to meet the outstanding
obligations in the least painful manner possible."
12. Viewed in their total, the prospects of Croatia
within the United Nations seem to be good. Having
shown determination and patience, as well as
strength, in the struggle for independence and ter-
ritorial integrity, it is now time for Croatia to ex-
hibit diligence and ingenuity. The problems inher-
ited from the period of struggle for independence
and integrity ought to be dealt with in a manner
which clearly demonstrates that Croatia is a mature
and responsible state, which has nothing against the
monitoring by the international community and
which practices transparent policies, but which does
not accept tutelage. The upsurge in economic de-
velopment, the advancement of democracy, the rule
of law and the protection of human rights that is
1 See the speech by Dr Franjo Tudman, President of
the Republic of Croatia, at the 46th Session of the
UN General Assembly on the occasion of the admis-
sion of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations,
I. Simonovi6 et al. (Ed.), Hrvatska i Ujedinjeni narodi,
Zagreb, 1996, p. 565.
2 Admission to the United Nations, as the expression
of collective recognition by member states, helped in
the defence of the territorial integrity of the state,
above all by enabling Croatia to invoke directly the
provisions of the UN Charter on self-defence (Art.
51). However, besides having legal grounds for self-
defence, one has to have the strength to do that as
well. The international defence mechanisms of the
UN member states are not yet sufficiently effective to
guarantee defence against aggression, or the recov-
ery of occupied territories.
3 In our view, in interpreting the provisions of Art. 2
of the Basic Agreement "...Transitional Administration
which shall govern the Region during the transitional
period ..." we should proceed from the meaning and
purpose of the quoted provision and from the Basic
Agreement as such, and that is the peaceful reinte-
gration of the Croatian Danube Region into the con-
stitutional-legal system of the Republic of Croatia
and the gradual transfer of powers from the Transi-
tional Administration to the bodies of local self-gov-
ernment and government established on the basis of
the election results and to the central bodies of
public administration of the Republic of Croatia. If an
extension of the current UNTAES mandate is im-
posed on Croatia after July 15, this will mean that
the transfer of power at midnight, 15 January, 1998,
will be momentary, without having given the elected
bodies of local government and self-government a
chance to start properly functioning. This could pro-
voke instability and seriously hamper the work of
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expected after the establishment of territorial in-
tegrity will also strengthen Croatia's international
standing and enable Croatian diplomats at the UN
to concern themselves with new priorities.
Croatia's history in the United Nations is very
brief but also very intensive. Croatian diplomacy has
given its contribution to the establishment, defence
and stabilisation of the Croatian state. Finally,
Croatia can look forward to decades, even centu-
ries, of contributing to the welfare of the interna-
tional community and upholding its own interests.
Having had direct experience of the shortcomings
in the methods of adjustment of interests practised
by the international community through the UN
system, and having acquired some skills at fighting
in the diplomatic arena, Croatia will take active part
in the shaping of the United Nations of the future.
By defending general interests, Croatia will best
defend its own interests as well.
•
local government bodies in the Croatian Danube
Region.
4 Prompted by the Croatian Government's Letter of
Intention on the conclusion of the peaceful reintegra-
tion of the area under UNTAES administration, the
Serbian side tried to lend a new quality to the
provision of the Basic Agreement on demilitarisation
by extending it beyond the context of the Basic
Agreement. This provision was used as grounds for
requesting "complete and permanent demilitarisation ...
both with respect to weapons and to armed person-
nel" (par. 5.1 of the letter of the "Assembly and
Executive Council of the region of Eastern Siavonia,
Baranja and West Sirmium" of 16January 1997). This
request by the local Serb community has no grounds
in the Basic Agreement, which provides for
demilitarisation only during the time-span covered by
the Basic Agreement, i.e. during the transitional pe-
riod. The UN Secretary General, in a letter to the
Chairman of the Security Council, confirms this view
by stating: "It should be noted that UNTAES has no
mandate to pursue directly the questions of the post-
UNTAES military status of the region.".
5 Of the eight persons detained, four are Croats, two
are Moslems and two Serbs. The only senior civilian
official or military officer is General Blaskic - who
came of his own free will and who has been waiting
to be tried for over a year. None of the detainees
has been indicted for war crimes committed during
the aggression against the Republic of Croatia.
6 The Badinter Commission is the arbitration com-
mission set up by the European Union and the
United Nations with the consent of the parties, in-
cluding Serbia and Montenegro, and therefore also
with their obligation to accept the findings of the
commission.
7 The agreement on normalisation of relations be-
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tween Croatia and FRY, concluded
on 23 August, 1996, does not in-
troduce any changes. However, Art.
5 par. 1 of the Agreement men-
tions the "state continuity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia",
however, par. 2 of the same article
provides for a fully reciprocal "con-
tinuity of Croatian statehood". In
other words, the Republic of Croatia
has recognised the state continu-
ity of the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia in relation to its prede-
cessors, starting from the Princi-
palities of Serbia and Montenegro
and up to the SFRY, i.e. its con-
stituent federal units, the Socialist
Republic of Serbia and the Social-
ist Republic of Montenegro; like-
wise, the Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia recognised the continuity
of the Republic of Croatia in rela-
tion to all the predecessors from
which Croatia derives its state con-
tinuity, including the SFRY, i.e. the
Socialist Republic of Croatia. This
reciprocal recognition of continuity
clearly demonstrates that this was
a question of purely historical con-
tinuity, not of a continuity in a
legal sense that would warrant to
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
a privileged status in relation to
the other successors.
8 The threat of interest rates ap-
plies so far only to the debt due
to non-payment of regular contri-
butions to the UN budget. Croatia's
debt on this basis amounts to
1,755,040 US dollars. If interest on
debt is indeed imposed, then it is
quite possible that the same prin-
ciple will be applied to the other
parts of the debt as well.











- RO- RO reefers
- Containers
- Railway - ferries
3. Electrical machines
- Three-phase low-tension
synchronous generator, 5 to
1500 kVA,
- Three-phase low-tension syn-
chronous generator, 100 to
2500 kW, licence SIEMENS,
- Three-phase high-tension
syn-chronous generator,
1 to 1- 5MVA,
- Three-phase synchronous
and asynchronous electric
motors of various outputs,
own design and under
SIEMENS licence,
- Electric generating sets
- Marine electric generating
sets having output between





- two stroke, licence MAN B&W
- components for MAN B&W
two stroke engines
- four stroke diesel engines,
licence SEMT Pielstick
types PA4-185 and PA4-200
- step up gears for shaft
generators
4. Welding machines
- Converter for arc welding
- Welding converter
- Rectifier for welding
- Transformer for welding
- MIG-MAG semi-automatic
welding machine
- TIG arc welding machine
- Flame cutting machine.
5. Outfittings
- Engine room cranes,
SWL 1 to 6.4 tons
- Monorail deck cranes,
SWL 3 to 6.2 tons
- Electrical deck cranes,
SWL 0.1 ton/1m - 4 tons!7m
- Fireresistant doors.
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